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Regime theory is now the dominant paradigm for the study of urban politics not only in the USA but also the UK, where scholars (Lawless, 1994; Harding, 1994, 1996, 2000; Stoker and Mossberger, 1994; Stoker, 1995; Davies, 2001) have debated whether it can throw light on the spread of urban regeneration partnerships.  However, such studies have often strayed far from the formulation developed by Elkin (1987) and Stone (1989) and have little in common with one another either.  Therefore, they do not share a common conceptual framework for debating the comparative reach of regime theory.  This paper suggests a framework for comparison but based on four case studies of regeneration partnerships finds that regime theory is not a fruitful approach for understanding partnerships between local political and business elites in the UK.  Not only do local regeneration partnerships not resemble regimes, they are sustained by a very different interplay of variables.  Where regimes depend on financial interdependence, regeneration partnerships depend on an ideological commitment to collaboration within local authorities that see market-led growth as the only hope for the regeneration of their communities.  Where urban regimes are comparatively autonomous and informal networks, regeneration partnerships are bureaucratic structures under strong central government controls.  Moreover, where collaboration is necessary for the production of shared governing outcomes in regime theory, regeneration partnerships in the UK have not generated such outcomes.  While this is the dominant picture, however, small-scale partnership initiatives focused on delivery rather than policy and strategy are demonstrating a degree of collaborative synergy.  In the long term, these partnerships might be the basis for regime politics.  Nevertheless, it is unlikely in the context of a centralising UK Government that these initiatives are the seed from which regime-like coalitions might grow.  

The paper begins with an outline of the main assumptions in regime theory and an overview of UK-based adaptations.  It proceeds to outline a set of characteristics and structuring variables that define regime politics for the purposes of comparison.  The empirical section of the paper reports research on regeneration partnerships in four case studies and contrasts these partnerships with urban regimes.  An explanation for this contrast is developed and, finally, the paper explores possible directions for developing a cross-national regime theory.  

Urban Regime Theory 
A brief summary of the theoretical foundations of regime theory aids the task of constructing a comparative framework (see Stoker, 1995; Davies, 2002a). It begins with Stone’s conception of systemic power as:

that dimension of power in which durable features of the socioeconomic system confer advantages and disadvantages on groups in ways predisposing public officials to favour some interests at the expense of others … because its operation is completely impersonal and deeply embedded in the social structure, this form of power can appropriately be termed ‘systemic’ (Stone, 1980: 980). 

For Stone, the essential feature of the socio-economic system is a division of labour between state and market.  Ownership of productive assets rests primarily in the hands of business, while the machinery of government is subject to democratic control.  Due to its ownership of productive assets, business controls resources required by governments to carry out their political commitments.  This means that in government, there is a structural tendency to advance the demands of business elites above those of others, in order to generate revenues.  

In the US, systemic power is institutionalised through the fiscal structures of city politics.  Many US cities raise a high proportion of revenues through taxes levied on business. Local political leaders, like their national counterparts, depend on business sponsorship for election campaigns (Elkin, 1987: 70).  These factors predispose local political leaders to court business interests and organise their governing agendas accordingly.  Given that each party is aware of its dependence on the other, partners collaborate willingly through informal networking mechanisms (Stone, 1989: 6).  

For Elkin (1987: 32-42), attracting mobile capital is an essential function of collaboration. Locally dependent capital (mainly land and property) requires mobile capital investments to increase the value of its assets.  On the other hand, the city government wants to improve its fiscal base, which depends on these values rising.  This formulation is narrowly concerned with land and property.  However, it points to the significance of locally dependent capital in regime politics.  It implies that the weaker this fraction of capital, the harder it will prove to construct an effective business regime.  

Elkin (1987) and Stone (1993) recognise that business domination of regimes is not inevitable, particularly in cities cushioned from dependence on local capital by Federal grants.  Stone (1993), for example, describes a ‘lower class opportunity’ regime type that he believes should be the goal of activists in US cities.  Thus, he has concentrated on the detailed processes of regime building and maintenance more than the restraints imposed by the political economy context in which city politics occur.  He asserts against Peterson (1981) and the Structuralist tradition within Marxism (Althusser, 1979) that local politics matter and that agents other than business elites can mobilise influence in alternative governing coalitions.  ‘Power to’ is therefore as important as ‘power over’ in explaining urban political outcomes.  This ‘social production’ model of power means that it is important to study the way actors behave and draw lessons from them.  The problem Stone has therefore addressed over the past ten years is how to build lower class opportunity regimes around policies to ameliorate inequalities in the urban political system (Stone, 1998, 2001).  

Regime Theory and Urban Politics in the UK
Shortly after Elkin (1987) and Stone (1989) published their seminal accounts of regime politics in Dallas and Atlanta, scholars began to consider whether urban regime theory might explain the proliferation of economic regeneration partnerships in the UK.  There is a perception in the literature that the development of regeneration partnerships in the UK was caused, in part, by its copying urban policy initiatives from the USA (see Wolman, 1992; Atkinson, 1995: 8).  Ward argues that:

The 1980s witnessed attempts to import to the UK an ‘American’ philosophy, culture and ideology that actively seeks to incorporate the business sector into urban regeneration’ (1996: 427).

The British government has certainly drawn heavily on US urban policy initiatives since 1979, when the Thatcher government started promoting business-led urban regeneration (Berger and Foster, 1982; Boyle, 1985; Wolman, 1992; Ward, 1996).  If ‘policy transfer’ (Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996; Evans and Davies, 1999) has led to convergence between local politics in the UK and the US (Bennett, 1991a,b), then urban regimes should be developing in the UK too.   One objective of this paper is to explain why they are not.  

British adaptations of regime theory are diverse.  Stoker and Mossberger (1994), for example, draw heavily on the Rhodes and Marsh (1992) model of policy network analysis to strip regime theory of its ethnocentricity.  However, in doing so they discard distinctive theoretical claims about the way systemic power conditions the process of coalition building in city politics.  The effect is that the approach stretches the regime concept too far.  
 
Others, including Alan Harding (1994), and contributors to Lauria’s (1997) collection have attempted to explain partnerships by integrating regulation theory and regime theory.   The problem with this manoeuvre is that regime theory was a deliberate departure from ‘Structuralist’ Marxism, from which regulation theory emerged.  For regulation theorists, each mode of regulation can be effective only for a limited period before inherent crisis tendencies undermine it.  As a crisis theory drawing on Marxism, regulation theory cannot simply be fused with neo-pluralist regime theory which, in its normative mode, requires that the market economy is sufficiently sustainable to support lower class opportunity regimes (Davies, 2002a: 9-13).  The two approaches are ontologically incommensurable and theoretical integration compromises one or other foundational assumption.  

UK scholars have also developed typologies aimed at pinning down what form urban regimes might take in the UK.  As noted above, Stoker and Mossberger (1994) base their model on network theory.  Di Gaetano and Klemanksi (1993) depart still further from the conceptual foundations of regime theory, using it to analyse competing coalitions within Bristol City Council.  They disregard the purpose of Elkin’s and Stone’s work in explaining local state and capital relations.  

The diversity of this brief selection from the literature is striking.  Evolving from a neo-pluralist political economy theory of interorganisational politics, would-be regime theorists have produced a plethora of competing models.  It is not surprising that such a rich body of work should stimulate creative theoretical modelling.  However, concept stretching to this extent leaves no common framework against which the comparative merits of the regime approach can be evaluated (Ward, 1997: 1494).  The framework set out below addresses this task and the remainder of the paper uses it to explain the contrast between regeneration partnerships in the UK and ‘Stonean’ regimes in the US.  

A Basis for Comparison
One approach to developing a comparative framework is to identify a set of regime characteristics that are commensurable with those identified by Elkin and Stone.  The characteristics set out below fulfil this purpose and provide the basis for comparison in the following sections.  To the extent they occur in regeneration partnerships, there may have been institutional convergence between UK partnerships and urban regimes.  

	The coalition includes local public sector and private economic elites, although others may assert themselves (Elkin, 1987; Stone, 1989)
	Co-operation occurs through informal networks based on trust, diplomacy, shared goals and resources (see Stone, 1989, Rhodes, 1999).  
	The networks enjoy a high level of day to day autonomy from other levels of Government (Davies, 2001, 2002b).
	The network is sustainable over a long period, like Atlanta’s regime (Stone, 1989).
	It concerns itself with the economic development of the City although it may address other issues, depending on who succeeds in grasping the levers of power (Stone, 1989)
	Collaboration generates governing outcomes, valued by regime actors, that would not occur if they operated independently (Stone, 2001).  Partners therefore depend on each other for the production of goods that they both value.  

Regime theory does not ignore structures (Davies, 2002a), although it re-asserts the role of agents in political explanation.  It is important, therefore, that comparative studies focus on the processes shaping and sustaining coalitions in the system of governing as well as the detailed processes of coalition construction. Four main structuring variables underpin regime politics in the USA.  

	Interdependence: systemic power is reflected in the fiscal structures of US urban politics – local governments depend on a local business tax base, while business needs local government to create a market-friendly infrastructure.  
	Local Dependence: locally dependent capital (mainly land and property) requires investment by mobile capital to increase the value of its assets.  The city government requires these values to rise in order to improve its fiscal base.  This shared need is the basis for collaboration in regime politics.   
	The Role of Government: federal government policies determine the degree of exposure to local market forces.  A high level of aid can cushion local governments against the dictates of the local economy.  A lower level of aid can further expose them.  
	Local Autonomy: the ambitions and actions of local actors determine the existence, form and governing agenda of urban regimes within this structured context.  

This framework could inform comparative studies on a wider basis than the UK.  It might be asked, for example, whether the characteristics of regime politics are evident only in structuring contexts similar to those in Dallas and Atlanta.  Alternatively, different institutional forms existing in a similar structuring context might suggest greater scope for political agency than Stone (1998) has hitherto demonstrated.  

UK Regeneration Partnerships 
The paper proceeds to contrast regeneration partnerships with regime politics, thus characterised.  It considers why, despite policy transfer, regimes have not emerged.  It argues, furthermore, that partnerships exist in a very different structured context to that in US cities. The research comprises case studies in four English areas – Barnsley, Rotherham, Hull and North East Lincolnshire (Grimsby) undertaken over a period of eighteen months.  All four areas suffered from severe economic decline and social deprivation, particularly during the 1980s.  All had been Labour Party strongholds for many years – a characteristic of most local authorities in England over the last two decades.  Each had begun building regeneration partnerships involving local business leaders in response to these conditions.  Economic development is the traditional concern of regime theory and regeneration partnerships are the obvious choice for comparative purposes.   They have also featured in many UK studies utilising the regime framework.  

The case studies comprised ninety semi-structured interviews with elite actors from local authorities, chambers of commerce, Training and Enterprise Councils, and individual companies.  Two government ministers and six civil servants operating at the national and regional level were interviewed. Thirty interviews were conducted with actors from local business sector and its representative organisations, including actors who refused to join partnerships.   The remaining interviews were with local authority councillors and senior officers.  A range of other sources was used to triangulate the interview findings.  These sources included Council and business reports, newspaper reports, local archive sources and official website material.  

A distinction is made between ‘strategic’ partnerships establishing policy goals and making funding bids and ‘delivery’ partnerships undertaking the practical implementation of regeneration projects.  This distinction proved useful, as these partnership forms exhibit differing collaborative dynamics and may be a useful way of categorising research into partnerships more generally.  The following sections discuss the case study material draw on the regime characteristics outlined above to analyse the regeneration partnerships examined in the case studies. 

Participation
In each case, business leaders had begun participating in regeneration partnerships in recent years. Respondents in Barnsley recalled that in the 1980s, there was an ideological division between the Council and business leaders.  ‘Never the twain shall meet’ was a common description of relationships at that time.  Until the mid-1980s, the four local authorities were largely committed to a state-led model of economic development.  According to councillors who remember the period a number of factors caused them to reformulate their political strategies. The first was the disastrous general election defeat of 1983 at the hands of Margaret Thatcher, after which the Labour Party began moving away from commitments, such as nationalisation, long cherished by the party rank and file.  The second factor was Thatcher’s defeat of the 1984-5 coal strike.  In Barnsley and Rotherham, the industry was annihilated in the following years.  Labour councillors and officer allies began to reformulate their political strategies, accepting market-led growth as the only feasible strategy for regeneration.  The third related development was the defeat of Municipal Socialism (see Boddy and Fudge, 1984), a strategy which involved open defiance of Government limits on taxation and spending prosecuted most notably in Liverpool City Council by the Marxist Militant Tendency.  Because this strategy was not working, Labour Councils accepted that they would have to mend fences with a Tory government.  The fourth element was the third consecutive general election defeat for Labour in 1987.  This defeat further convinced Labour leaders that they had no choice but to embrace business-led development.  In short, knowing that they had been roundly defeated on all fronts, local Labour politicians decided to cooperate with the Government.  The national party leadership was pressuring them to do so and they increasingly perceived co-operation as the only way to secure badly needed resources to tackle deprivation.  Thus, the four local authorities turned to partnerships as the way forward for regeneration.  

However, business participation in partnerships was very limited both quantitatively and qualitatively.  Business leaders tended to lack the time or the inclination to become involved in activities that generated costs, but not profitability.   The result was that participation was limited to a handful of activists in each locality.  Much of this participation occurred through the representative structures of local chambers of commerce and statutory training and enterprise councils with business-led Boards.  The most active corporate partners were those big enough to absorb the cost of commitments to lengthy meetings and those with a degree of local dependence or cultural attachment to the area.  A corporation was far more likely to become involved in a partnership if it depended on local labour, markets and materials or its Chief Executive shared a sense of loyalty to the area.  Those with little material or cultural attachment to the locality saw no point in becoming involved.  Hence, few business leaders were involved in partnerships and those who were often played a symbolic role.  

Networks or Bureaucracies
One of the dominant incentives for local actors to join partnerships has been the Single Regeneration Budget (SRB).  This is a central government fund aimed at deprived areas, but awards to locality are conditional on the development of partnerships.  The process of competing for and managing the SRB occupied strategic partnerships in each case.  The SRB was perceived as an important facilitator of partnership working, offering an element of control over resources to businesses that otherwise would have no direct say over local public spending.   However, it was widely condemned for generating bureaucracy in partnerships.  For example, the Rotherham Economic Partnership was established in the early 1990s with a formal board structure.  Earlier, a less formal partnership had been criticised by Government for a ‘lack of structure’ and held responsible for the failure of a crucial funding bid.  Partners saw the demands of the SRB tying them up in procedures at which local authorities are adept, but are alien to businesses.  Furthermore, Government demands that partnerships be accountable for the funds they spend tied them up in complex bids and the production of detailed data on performance.  In this box-ticking culture, any impulse there may have been for networking around the development of shared objectives was overwhelmed.    

However, there was some evidence of networking.  Actors in North East Lincolnshire identified informal links between local authorities and business leaders in the form of meetings and telephone calls beyond the confines of official partnerships.  It was said that these links had been founded on the trust that developed from the mid 1980s.  However, nobody suggested that actors were taking important decisions outside formal partnership structures (although respondants might keep such information from a researcher).  As such, the dominant mode of collaboration in the case studies was bureaucratic, rather than networking. 

Local Autonomy
As noted above, the turn to partnership among local authorities had as much to do with political changes in the Labour Party as with Governmental incentives.  Nevertheless, Government has been highly influential, not only in encouraging the development of bureaucratic partnership structures, but in prescribing policy agendas too. The Rotherham Economic Partnership is a good example.  According to a senior councillor, it was established because ‘that is what the government said we have got to do’.  An analysis of central and local documentation demonstrated that the Partnership’s policy direction closely mirrored changes in government priorities.  These priorities evolved from a narrow concern with economic development, to a wider concern with social and economic regeneration.

There were also instances of direct intervention by government officials in the policy orientation of partnerships.  One respondent in Rotherham reported that the Government’s regional office had vetoed a motor-maintenance project developed by young unemployed males because it was too expensive.  Partners expressed similar frustrations in the other cases.  Negative perceptions of government intervention were strongest in strategic partnerships attempting to develop holistic regeneration strategies based on local needs and priorities.  In these cases, respondents argued that Government funding priorities had undermined collaborative advantage by tying partners up in complex funding programmes at the expense of local priorities. 

However, there was evidence of greater autonomy in delivery partnerships, those organised around specific projects. For example, Hull CityImage, a place-marketing partnership, was established to tackle negative perceptions of the City as a deprived and decayed fishing-town.  The partnership established a bond scheme through which businesses purchased a stake in the image enhancement programme.  Bondholders purchased access to local political leaders, including meetings where they were informed about forthcoming initiatives in the City (without, they emphasised, purchasing competitive advantage).  The modest revenues raised from the bond were used to lever funds from the UK Government and the European Union.  Partners agreed that a united front between corporate and political elites was essential if the City was to sell itself effectively.  The partnership used funds from the scheme to launch an ambitious place-marketing strategy, re-branding Hull a ‘pioneering city’. 

Sustainability




Regeneration partnerships are inevitably, but not exclusively, concerned with economic development.  This could hardly be otherwise, since governmental incentives have encouraged it and all four local authorities viewed market-led growth as the key to generating employment for their constituents.  Patterns of inward investment activity varied between the cases.  In Barnsley, new investment was the top priority because of its decimated business base and the availability of vacant sites.  In Hull, there were few brown-field sites and the priority for regeneration was to nurture its diverse business base.  For example, Hull sought to increase trade through a partnership promoting the City Port.  Where new investment was a priority, it tended to be organised through a hierarchical structure in which partnerships played little role.  At the top was the national Invest in Britain Bureau (IBB) and its regional offices, which forwarded most corporate inquiries to localities. One US investor in Barnsley explained that the IBB network introduced it to the town after it had expressed an interest in investing in the UK.  Barnsley Council explained that the IBB invited it to detail appropriate sites, which IBB then passed back to the company.  At this stage the potential beneficiaries, including a competitor in Germany, put forward packages including tax breaks and training.  Barnsley was successful not because of these incentives but because the company thought an English-speaking labour force was crucial.  Neither the locality, nor the local investment partnership, played a significant role in selling Barnsley.  The Company was more interested in the broad geographical and cultural characteristics of the UK than any specific place.  Overall, the importance of global investment capital varied.  In Barnsley, the majority of recent investments came from overseas ‘sunrise industries’.  In the other three areas, UK-based capital provided the majority of new investment capital.  

Nevertheless, collaboration may have had some impact on investment decisions.  The Barnsley Miller Partnership, a venture company comprising Miller Developments and Barnsley Council, was established to stimulate investment and job creation in the area.  To this end, both parties invested resources and shared the risk that individual projects might not come to fruition.  The partnership secured one overseas investment that generated 100 jobs, only after lengthy negotiations about site assembly. It was claimed that without the partnership the project could have fallen through as the developer might otherwise have lost interest.  Bound by a partnership agreement, it was obliged to maintain its commitment.  Other place-marketing partnerships, including the City-Port partnerships in Hull and North East Lincolnshire, were established to attract investment and trade.   In these cases, locally dependent businesses saw an opportunity to enhance their competitive position.  It remains to be seen whether initiatives of this kind succeed in enhancing trade or enticing investment capital.  

Synergy
Partners thought that the main ‘added value’ achieved by strategic partnerships extra funding from central government.  Yet, local authority leaders were well aware that this was evidence of external manipulation, not partnership synergy.  In Rotherham and Hull, for example, senior figures thought that such funds would be better spent if channelled directly through the Council.  In a survey published by Hull’s strategic partnership, CityVision, only a small percentage of respondents believed it had generated outcomes that would not have occurred by other means. 

Most participating business leaders were cynical, or even hostile toward strategic partnerships.  A business leader from Barnsley pointed out that while the Barnsley Regeneration Forum (the strategic partnership) stimulated cross-sector discussion, it had failed to make an impression on the social and economic problems of the Town.  A senior executive on Rotherham’s Economic Partnership saw it as a ‘fashionable’ gesture to funding agencies, ‘servicing a dogma’, but generating no added value.  A business activist said of Hull CityVision that it had not done anything groundbreaking and that its objectives were a wish list.   The vice-chair of the North East Lincolnshire Regeneration Partnership, Grimsby’s strategic partnership, admitted that he had not attended a meeting in a long time and took an interest in partnership business only insofar as it affected his company.

Yet, there was evidence of value added in some of the delivery partnerships.  The Barnsley Miller Partnership noted above, secured jobs that might not otherwise have come to fruition.  The CityImage partnership claimed that its branding of Hull as a ‘pioneering city’ had encouraged an ambitious and successful bid to the Millennium Commission for a learning and tourism facility called ‘The Deep’.  It claimed to have enhanced local ambitions and confidence that, in turn, secured a prestige development for the city. 

The Bureaucratic Model of Collaboration in the UK
These findings demonstrate that regeneration partnerships are very different from regimes.  While the first condition - participation of local authority and business elites – is satisfied, business participation is largely symbolic.  This does not mean that business demands do not influence the local governing agenda - market led regeneration is, after all, a high priority for the partnerships - but local businesses have no direct role in establishing it.  Collaboration, such as it is, mainly takes place in bureaucratised structures that alienate business and make it difficult to discuss local priorities and needs.  The policy agenda of the strategic partnerships tends to reflect priorities set by central government and they do not enjoy political autonomy with significant business contributions to ideas and financing.  The sustainability of strategic partnerships is questionable, given their lack of political power and the resultant cynicism of both local authority and business leaders. Those involved were unable to identify added value, save for Governmental funds.  

Delivery partnerships were more substantial, generating local business resources in pursuit of locally determined objectives.  Where the potential for bottom-line benefits was recognised, and there existed a degree of local autonomy, business leaders were more inclined to share risk and contribute resources.  However, these initiatives were on a small scale compared to the resources available to strategic partnerships.  To the extent that there was evidence of networking around local priorities, it was on a small-scale. Box 1 highlights the contrasts between regime politics and the bureaucratic mode of collaboration identified in the four cases discussed here. The following section considers why the development of partnerships has followed such a different trajectory from its US counterparts.  

Characteristics	Regimes	Regeneration Partnerships
Participants (Business and Local Authority)	Symbiotic relationship.  Other sectors may muscle in.	Symbolic relationship.  Closer relationship in a few delivery partnerships.
Mode of Cooperation	Informal	Bureaucratic – less so in some cases of delivery partnerships. 
Autonomy	High – locally negotiated agenda for the city.  	Low – partnership carries out government agenda.  More autonomy in fragmented delivery partnerships.  
Sustainability	High.	Unclear for strategic partnerships.Higher for delivery partnerships
Objectives	Locally determined and likely to be growth-centred.	Centrally determined and growth-centred.  Some evidence of localism.
Synergy	High – achievement of otherwise unattainable goals	Low – one or two exceptions.  
Box 1: Regimes Versus Partnerships

Explaining Institutional Divergence
Regime Theory offers a relatively simple explanation for business regimes in the USA.  While building and sustaining regimes is complex, the societal dynamics in which they evolve are relatively straightforward.  There is strong material interdependence between city government and business in the USA around common interests and a longstanding culture of business participation in local politics (Stone, 1989).  In the UK, central government grants account for a much higher percentage of local government expenditure than revenue raised directly from local taxation (John, 1997).  Local Government is not dependent on local business for funding core activities.  Local authorities therefore have better insulation from the fiscal pressures that structure urban regimes in the USA.  Consequently, despite the fact that successive UK governments have used the USA as a model for business-led urban regeneration, they have not made local authorities dependent on business resources.  The UK Government’s attempts to engineer partnerships have created an entirely different model of collaboration. The following sections compare the dynamics shaping UK regeneration partnerships with those generating regime politics.   

Interdependence – the ‘Logic’ of Market-led Regeneration 
In regime theory, the main factor driving local government and business into coalitions is the dependence of each on the resources the other brings to the table.  In the cases here discussed, material interdependence is not significant.  Rather, the emergence of a pre-disposition among local political elites toward business-led regeneration was crucial in creating a favourable environment for partnerships.  By 1990 defeats inflicted by the Thatcher governments on the industrial working class, reforms to local government and a move to the right in the Labour Party leadership neutralised the left in local government (Stoker, 1990: 167). A perception that the business sector must play a leading role in economic regeneration produced a ‘logic’ of collaboration among local political leaders beset by social and economic problems. According to Elkin (1994: 122), collaboration is the ‘rational’ response of public officials to whoever controls productive assets.  This appears to be true in the UK too, not because local authorities are materially dependent on business elites but because they are committed to market led development in the perceived absence of an alternative strategy.  

Local Dependence: Explaining Business Antipathy
A small number of larger businesses engaged in partnerships, believing that they could enhance their competitive positions by building a positive image in the local community.  However, business leaders tended to lack the time or the inclination to become involved in strategic activities not directly instrumental to enhanced profits.  Thus, the US notion of a highly organised business sector, representing ‘concentrated CEO firepower’ in city politics finds little resonance in the UK (Austin and McCaffrey, 2002: 44).  The evidence suggests that to the extent businesses have become involved in partnerships, they tend to be dependent on the locality.  Examples such as CityImage demonstrate that some locally dependent businesses are collaborating with local authorities in place marketing, although place marketing cannot account for most investments.  However, local dependence cannot be the main determinant of business attitudes toward partnerships, as most locally dependent businesses are uninterested in collaboration. Four other factors help explain negative business attitudes to partnership.

First, the local business sector does not have direct leverage with the local authority on account of the financial structures of local government.  These structures insulate it from the full blast of local economic forces.  Secondly, and perhaps consequently, local business interests are not organised in strong representative organisations as they are in the US (Austen and McCaffrey, 2002).  Chambers of Commerce are weak representative organisations and have little corporate weight behind them.  Offe (1985) argues that that the collective representation of business in market economies is weak because its privileged structural position makes representation unnecessary.  On the other hand, business interests are not homogenous and the state cannot support all segments of capital simultaneously (Peck and Tickell, 1995: 59/60).  Individual segments may therefore unite to articulate their policy interests.  Both perspectives may be right up to a point.  The system of financing local government in the US encourages competing parties to jostle for position.  It creates a rationale for the downtown business elite to organise, as it does in Atlanta.  Given the lack of financial autonomy for local government in the UK, it is more sensible for business to concentrate its lobbies nationally.  It does this formally through bodies like the Confederation of British Industry and the Institute of Directors and informally through its links to political parties (see Osler, 2002 concerning the pervasive influence of business elites on Tony Blair’s Government). 

A third factor is that in the UK the premise of the ‘local dependence’ thesis, that the pursuit of global capital investment drives local authorities and businesses together, seems flawed.  As the case studies show, inward investment activities are conducted primarily through public sector institutions beyond the locality (see also Wood, 1996). More importantly, there was little evidence that place-marketing partnerships were having an impact on investment decisions. The problem for most cities may be that they do not have the global profile of places like New York, London and Tokyo (Sassen, 1991).  Thus, global firms make their approaches at the national level in the UK and localities rely on regional and national bodies for patronage. 

A final factor underplayed in the literature is that cities may not compete for mobile investment capital at all.  The growth of local enterprises may be more important, as in Hull, where a good business base already exists and suitable sites for new investment are far and few between.  Furthermore, the importance of global capital may itself be over-estimated in localities where national capital remains the most important source of growth.  This was so in all the cases except Barnsley.   

However, place-marketing partnerships are emerging.  Thus, it seems, local elite perceptions of economic globalisation may have influenced partnership strategies.  However, this does not mean that place-marketing partnerships follow economic trends in a deterministic fashion.  The question remains, however, as to whether such initiatives make a difference in terms of bringing in new investments that would not otherwise occur.  Since global firms often have a strongly pre-determined idea about their investment needs, they may make little difference.

Thus, the idea that localities are forced to compete for mobile capital in place marketing projects (see Cox, 1995, Harding and Le Gales, 1997) seems exaggerated (see Harding, 1997).  There may be truth in the claim by Hall and Hubbard (1996: 160) that the urban politics literature exhibits a crude conception of the relations between local and global. This does not mean that competition for globally mobile capital does not occur, or that globalisation is not important in explaining contemporary state restructuring.  However, it is of marginal significance in explaining the emergence of regeneration partnerships in the UK.  Political responses to these conditions are much more important.  There is, therefore, a lop-sided dynamic in the structuring of partnerships.  Local authorities are under strong political compulsion to harness business expertise and resources in regeneration partnerships, but business has no need to reciprocate. This makes for the weak partnerships that predominated in the case studies.

Local Autonomy and the Role of Government
Mrs Thatcher’s Government began copying American urban policies in the early 1980s with its adaptation of the Urban Development Action Grant (Wolman, 1992).  Successive governments introduced a series of measures in the 1980s and 1990s to promote business leadership in regeneration and partnership working.  From 1997, the Blair Government endorsed and further developed them.  Local Labour Parties responded to the combination of economic decline and political defeat by extending a hand to business, but the goals and structures of regeneration partnerships depended largely on urban policy initiatives from the centre.  As noted above, these initiatives encouraged bureaucratic partnerships but did not delegate political power.  Consequently, the Government has curtailed local autonomy and undermined such collaborative potential as may otherwise have developed. 

It is possible to suggest, therefore, why the UK Government’s fashion for copying US style urban policies has resulted in such different collaborative mechanisms.  Due to the absence of structured incentives for local authorities and business elites to collaborate, the UK Government has tried to engineer them on its own terms.  However, Stone (1989: 242) argues that federal funding schemes designed to stimulate urban development can undermine business leadership of urban regimes.  The extent to which cities can resist business demands relates to the level of federal aid.  The UK Government borrowed US regeneration programmes for the opposite purpose of encouraging business participation.  However, they have had the effect Stone predicts of substituting for business resources.  The UK Government has done nothing to expose local authorities to the full force of local economic conditions – and it would likely be political suicide to try.  Instead, the Government has implemented urban policy incentives to encourage partnerships.  At the same time, it controls local purse strings and seeks to ensure that these partnerships fulfil central objectives.  Such an approach encourages collaborative tokenism because partnerships have little power.  Business elites recognise this and abstain from the process.  

This situation calls into question widely held views about the process of state restructuring since the late 1970s.  A popular thesis propagated by regulation theorists is that technical innovations, enabling the globalisation of production processes, have generated a new era characterised by enhanced local autonomy and innovative forms of urban governance. They say that the new phenomenon of entrepreneurial cities exemplifies an emerging Schumpeterian workfare or competitive state.  On the other hand, there has been economic aggregation at the supra-national level, through global and European institutions (Harding, 1994: 370).   This two-sided development has squeezed the national state, whose dependence on global trade makes national interventionist economic strategies ineffective (Harding, 1996: 649).  In this schema, globalisation and economic restructuring have resulted in a global-local ‘dialectic’ in which, to a greater or lesser extent, the national state is becoming marginal.   Rhodes (1996, 1997, 1999), in a related UK literature on the ‘new governance’, has claimed that local politics are increasingly characterised by self-organising, inter-organisational networks (like regimes).  He claims that these networks enjoy a significant degree of autonomy from the State which, weakened by global restructuring, can no longer ‘row’, but only ‘steer’.  This world of networks is the outcome of restructuring characterised as the ‘hollowing out of the State’.  Where local governing mechanisms in the ‘Fordist’ era were characterised by command structures and state-led delivery of services, they are now characterised by market-led service delivery and a negotiated governing agenda based on trust between partners. 

Although these approaches have their roots in neo-Marxism, they also predict the emergence of regime-like forms of governing.  This perhaps is why scholars have tried to integrate regulation and regime theories.  However, in finding that regimes do not exist in the UK, the case studies also cast great doubt on the idea of an entrepreneurial local state.  It is not within the competence of this paper to say how far globalisation has rendered national economic strategies ineffective.  However, the evidence shows that the British State remains a powerful political player.  Some elements of the ‘hollowing out’ thesis ring true, for example the extent to which state provided services in the UK have been privatised.  At the same time, however, the political reach of the state seems to be increasing.  As Davies (2001: 217) puts it, the state may be delegating responsibilities for economic regeneration to the locality, but it is not delegating political power.  It is delegating responsibilities in a way that enables it to manipulate local politics, thereby purchasing new institutional capacity in the locality.  Partnership may therefore be as much about bringing other groups into cooperation with the State’s agenda as creating partnerships between local actors.  It seems to be a policy instrument quite unlike governing regimes and networks.  If the state is hollowing out, its role in the local politics of regeneration is nevertheless expanding.  Hence the metaphor used to explain the changing role of the state - from ‘steering’ to ‘rowing’ - seems inappropriate.  Rather, it is still rowing, if not economically then politically.  However, it is rowing in a direction that makes the emergence of regime politics highly unlikely.  At the very least, these theories tend to underestimate the possibility that in this new global economic context, the power of the state may be increasing in certain arenas.  





Where Next for Regime Theory?
In the UK, the search for regimes resembling those in Dallas and Atlanta is likely to be fruitless.  Equally, describing any partnership form as an ‘urban regime’ hides important distinctions between different modes of collaboration.  What, then, do these conclusions mean for the future of regime theory?  One obvious answer is that urban studies must avoid concept stretching.  There is little to be learned from underplaying the differences between institutions as diverse as Atlanta’s urban regime and the Rotherham Economic Partnership.  This does not mean that there are no grounds for comparison.  However, as it stands, regime theory is not an adequate tool for this purpose.  Regime theorists might therefore consider the following research directions to overcome some of these difficulties. 

Firstly, exploration of the relationship between regime theory and the ‘new governance’ (Rhodes, 1997) could be useful.  Regime theory focuses on power and process, whereas the ‘new governance’ looks at the emergence of networking in different policy arenas and at different geo-political levels.  Thus, the traditional focus of regime theory on economic regeneration may be too narrow, while the new governance needs more focus on power and process.  For example, Rhodes’ ‘governing without government’ thesis fails to recognise Stone’s (1989: 236) point that networks do not build themselves and they carry costs.  Regime theory, on the other hand, needs a sharper geo-political focus.  It may work in large cities with a powerful business base within a decentralised state, but what about smaller cities and towns with a weak business base in a centralised state?  Elkin (1987: 8) believes that regimes may exist in urban areas of 50,000 people or more, although he offers no evidence in support of this claim.  The question then arises as to whether regime theory is flexible enough to tackle inter-organisational politics at different spatial scales.  

Secondly, as Stone’s study of Atlanta over a forty-year period demonstrates, time matters.  Partnerships in the UK need mapping longitudinally.  Future research in the UK could fruitfully consider whether despite the current fashion, strategic partnerships wither away if delivery partnerships become better established and the Government concentrates its regeneration effort on small neighbourhoods (see SEU, 2001).  Equally, central government may begin to trust local government more and delegate power as well as responsibility, as it has promised for local authorities that meet its targets (DTLR, 2001).  It may also be that place marketing coalitions succeed in furnishing economic growth, thereby becoming embedded as a core governing activity based on shared priorities and resources.  Such changes could underpin the development of regime-like processes in the UK. 

Thirdly, future studies might take up the challenge Stone (1998) has set himself to explore how activists can construct lower class opportunity regimes to tackle social inequalities. While it is political elites that dominate UK partnerships rather than business elites, the essential problem of empowering people in deprived areas and reducing inequalities is the same (SEU, 2001).  Research might question whether there are comparative lessons to be learned about the construction of coalitions fulfilling this purpose.  Equally, scholars might consider why these coalitions seem difficult to construct and sustain whatever the geo-political context (Austin and McCaffrey, 2002: 37).

Finally, if regimes were to develop in the UK, they would inhabit a very different context to that in the USA.  Scholars might then explore the diversity of conditions compatible with regime politics, if they are found for example in both centralised and decentralised states.  If regime theory is to expand its geographical boundaries, it must explain differing modes of collaboration (and non-collaboration) in different societies.  It remains to be seen whether regime theorists can achieve this without sacrificing the power and sophistication of the original formulation.

Conclusion
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